Certainty Independence and the Separation of Utility and Beliefs
AbstractEconomists often operate under an implicit assumption that the tastes of a decision maker are constant, while his beliefs change with the availability of new information. It is therefore customary to seek representations of preferences which cleanly separate the taste component, called ‘utility,’ from the beliefs component. We show that a complete separation of utility from the other components of the representation is possible only if the decision maker’s preferences satisfy a mild but not completely innocuous condition, called ‘certainty independence.’ We prove that the preferences that obtain such separation are a subset of the biseparable preferences.nonatomic probability measures, we extend some of these results to the case of individuals with decreasing marginal evaluations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ICER - International Centre for Economic Research in its series ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series with number 40-2002.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2002
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Ghirardato, Paolo & Maccheroni, Fabio & Marinacci, Massimo, 2005. "Certainty Independence and the Separation of Utility and Beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(1), pages 129-136, January.
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Levine's Working Paper Archive
7616, David K. Levine.
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- Paolo Ghirardato & Massimo Marinacci, 2000. "Risk, Ambiguity and the Separation of Utility and Beliefs," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1143, Econometric Society.
- Ghirardato, Paolo & Marinacci, Massimo, 2000. "Risk, Ambigity and the Separation of Utility and Beliefs," Working Papers 1085, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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"A subjective spin on roulette wheels,"
ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series
17-2001, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research, revised Aug 2001.
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- Ghirardato, Paolo & Marinacci, Massimo, 2002. "Ambiguity Made Precise: A Comparative Foundation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 251-289, February.
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