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The Allocation and Dissipation of Resource Rents: Implications for Fishery Reform

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Author Info
Gary D. Libecap ()
Terry L. Anderson
Abstract

In the move to adopt rights based arrangements for renewable resources to avoid the losses of open access and the inefficiencies of prescriptive regulation, we argue that grandfathering the allotments of local users can be the most efficient distribution mechanism. We differ from the standard support among economists for auctions which contends that auctions allocate rights to the highest valued users and thereby maximize rents. Our contention is that rents are not a fixed stock as is commonly assumed, but rather depend upon the actions of those who use the natural resource and convert it into valuable goods and services. First-possession allocation assigns ownership and rents to existing users, reinforcing their incentives for stewardship and rent maximization. Resource rents are an important source of wealth and well being, especially in developing countries. By contrast the alternative, auction allocation, assigns ownership to winning bidders, but the rents are captured by the auctioneer, often the state, not local agents. We argue that there can be important efficiency effects. Our empirical focus is on fisheries, but the implications extend to other settings.

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Paper provided by ICER - International Centre for Economic Research in its series ICER Working Papers with number 13-2009.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:icr:wpicer:13-2009

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  1. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2007. "Inefficiency in Legislative Policymaking: A Dynamic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 118-149, March. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Milgrom, Paul, 1989. "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 3-22, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Johnson, Ronald N & Libecap, Gary D, 1982. "Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1005-22, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Johnson, Ronald N., 1995. "Implications Of Taxing Quota Value In An Individual Transferable Quota Fishery," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 10(4). [Downloadable!]
  6. Alberto Alesina & George-Marios Angeletos, 2005. "Fairness and Redistribution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 960-980, September. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Libecap, Gary D., 2007. "The Assignment of Property Rights on the Western Frontier: Lessons for Contemporary Environmental and Resource Policy," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(02), pages 257-291, June. [Downloadable!]
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  8. McMillan, John, 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 145-62, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Robert Deacon & Dominic Parker & Christopher Costello, 2008. "Improving Efficiency by Assigning Harvest Rights to Fishery Cooperatives: Evidence From the Chignik Salmon Co-op," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 04-08, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
  10. Anderson, Terry L & Hill, Peter J, 1975. "The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(1), pages 163-79, April.
  11. Hansen, Zeynep K. & Libecap, Gary D., 2004. "The allocation of property rights to land: US land policy and farm failure in the northern great plains," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 103-129, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Singhal, Monica, 2008. "Special interest groups and the allocation of public funds," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 548-564, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Fisher, Ronald C., 1982. "Income and grant effects on local expenditure: The flypaper effect and other difficulties," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 324-345, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. David P. Baron & Daniel Diermeier, 2001. "Elections, Governments, And Parliaments In Proportional Representation Systems," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(3), pages 933-967, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Stavins Robert N., 1995. "Transaction Costs and Tradeable Permits," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 133-148, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Leblanc, William & Snyder, James Jr. & Tripathi, Micky, 2000. "Majority-rule bargaining and the under provision of public investment goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 21-47, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Lueck, Dean, 1995. "The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 393-436, October.
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