The Neglected Effects of Demand Characteristics on the Sustainability of Collusion
AbstractAccording to traditional IO models, the characteristics of market demand (intercept, slope, elasticity) and of technology (level of symmetric marginal costs) do not play any role in defining the sustainability of collusive behaviors in Bertrand oligopolies. The paper modifies this counterintuitive result by showing that all the above mentioned factors do a¤ect the sustainability of collusion when prices are assumed to be discrete rather than continuous. The sign of these effects is unambiguous. Their magnitude varies greatly: in some cases it is totally negligible, in others it becomes extremely relevant.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ICER - International Centre for Economic Research in its series ICER Working Papers with number 03-2008.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2008
Date of revision:
collusion; market demand; Bertrand supergames.;
Other versions of this item:
- Gallice, Andrea, 2010. "The neglected effects of demand characteristics on the sustainability of collusion," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(4), pages 240-246, December.
- Gallice, Andrea, 2008. "The Neglected Effects of Demand Characteristics on the Sustainability of Collusion," CEPR Discussion Papers 6975, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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