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Order With Some Law: Complementarity VS. Substitution of Formal and Informal Arrangements Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Lazzarini, Sergio G.
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Falk, Armin & Gachter, Simon & Kovacs, Judit, 1999.
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Econometrica ,
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Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter & Georg Kirchsteiger, 1997.
"Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence ,"
Econometrica ,
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"Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts ,"
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MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1125-56, November.
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Other versions: Frank, Robert H & Gilovich, Thomas & Regan, Dennis T, 1993.
"Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation? ,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives ,
American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 159-71, Spring.
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Chamberlain, Gary, 1980.
"Analysis of Covariance with Qualitative Data ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(1), pages 225-38, January.
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Frey, Bruno S, 1997.
"A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues ,"
Economic Journal ,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1043-53, July.
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Bull, Clive, 1987.
"The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
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Butler, J S & Moffitt, Robert, 1982.
"A Computationally Efficient Quadrature Procedure for the One-Factor Multinomial Probit Model ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 761-64, May.
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Fehr, Ernst & Klein, Alexander & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001.
"Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Other versions:
Ernst Fehr & Alexander Klein & Klaus M. Schmidt, .
"Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness ,"
IEW - Working Papers
iewwp072, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW.
[Downloadable!] Fehr, Ernst & Klein, Alexander & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001.
"Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness ,"
Discussion Papers in Economics
18, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Ernst Fehr & Alexander Klein & Klaus Schmidt, 2001.
"Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
[Downloadable!] Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, .
"Do Incentive Contracts Crowd out Voluntary Cooperation? ,"
IEW - Working Papers
iewwp034, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW.
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Other versions: Iris Bohnet & Bruno S. Frey & Steffen Huck, .
"More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding ,"
IEW - Working Papers
iewwp052, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW.
[Downloadable!]
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