IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ias/cpaper/00-wp248.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Welfare-Improving Collusion in the Japanese Pork Import Market

Author

Listed:
  • Jacinto F. Fabiosa

Abstract

Under the World Trade Organization (WTO) safeguard provisions for pork, Japan can raise its gate price by 24 percent when imports in a given quarter are 119 percent higher than the average imports of the last three years of the same quarter. Both times Japan has invoked this safeguard, reductions in pork exporters' profits have been three times higher. Thus, foreign pork suppliers have an incentive to collude in order to avoiding triggering the safeguard. As the author argues, suppliers construct workable and efficient allocation rules with a multi-plant monopolist structure that allows trade of quota. This collusion is welfare-improving because the safeguard induces more inefficiencies, including larger deadweight.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacinto F. Fabiosa, 2000. "Welfare-Improving Collusion in the Japanese Pork Import Market," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 00-wp248, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
    • Handle: RePEc:ias:cpaper:00-wp248
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.card.iastate.edu/products/publications/pdf/00wp248.pdf
    File Function: Full Text
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.card.iastate.edu/products/publications/synopsis/?p=297
    File Function: Online Synopsis
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ias:cpaper:00-wp248. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/caiasus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.