Hugh Gravelle (National Primary Care Research and Development Centre, Centre for Health Economics, University of York) Peter Sivey () (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne)
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We examine the implications of policies to improve information about the qualities of profit seeking duopoly hospitals which face the same regulated price and compete on quality. We show that if the hospital costs of quality are similar then better information increases the quality of both hospitals. However if the costs are sufficiently different improved information will reduce the quality of both hospitals.
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Paper provided by Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne in its series Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series with number
wp2009n05.
Length: 30 pages Date of creation: Mar 2009 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:iae:iaewps:wp2009n05
Contact details of provider: Postal: Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne, Victoria 3010 Australia Phone: +61 3 8344 2100 Fax: +61 3 8344 2111 Email: Web page: http://www.melbourneinstitute.com/ More information through EDIRC
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