Monetary Policy at the European Periphery. Greek Experience and Lessons for Transition Economies
AbstractThis discussion paper draws the main conclusions from a book entitled Monetary Policy at the European Periphery: Greek Experience and Lessons for EU Candidates, forthcoming in the European and Transatlantic Studies Series, Springer-Verlag. This book proposes a coherent novel monetary policy regime suitable for the European Periphery on the road to the euro. The first part of the book examines the relation between the eleven founding members of the EMU (the Ins) and those countries staying out of the EMU (the Outs), paying particular attention to the European Periphery that includes Greece and all those CEE transition countries which have recently applied for EU membership that could eventually lead to full EMU membership. The second part of the book argues against ERM-II participation for those countries at the European Periphery. It spells out and highlights the limits regarding the efficiency of an ERM-II arrangement in a world of increased international capital movements, fiscal imbalances and asymmetric real shocks. The third part of the book develops aconsistent and credible monetary framework in achieving price stability at the European Periphery on the road to the EMU: the adoption of explicit and formal (possible differential) inflation targets together with granting political and economic independence to the central bank.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University in its series CERT Discussion Papers with number 9910.
Date of creation: 1999
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