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Monetary Policy at the European Periphery. Greek Experience and Lessons for Transition Economies

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  • Iannis A. Mourmouras
  • Michael G. Arghyrou

Abstract

This discussion paper draws the main conclusions from a book entitled Monetary Policy at the European Periphery: Greek Experience and Lessons for EU Candidates, forthcoming in the European and Transatlantic Studies Series, Springer-Verlag. This book proposes a coherent novel monetary policy regime suitable for the European Periphery on the road to the euro. The first part of the book examines the relation between the eleven founding members of the EMU (the Ins) and those countries staying out of the EMU (the Outs), paying particular attention to the European Periphery that includes Greece and all those CEE transition countries which have recently applied for EU membership that could eventually lead to full EMU membership. The second part of the book argues against ERM-II participation for those countries at the European Periphery. It spells out and highlights the limits regarding the efficiency of an ERM-II arrangement in a world of increased international capital movements, fiscal imbalances and asymmetric real shocks. The third part of the book develops aconsistent and credible monetary framework in achieving price stability at the European Periphery on the road to the EMU: the adoption of explicit and formal (possible differential) inflation targets together with granting political and economic independence to the central bank.

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Paper provided by Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University in its series CERT Discussion Papers with number 9910.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:hwe:certdp:9910

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  1. Minford, Patrick, 1993. "Time-inconsistency, Democracy and Optimal Contingent Rules," CEPR Discussion Papers 767, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Cukierman, Alex, 1994. "Central Bank Independence and Monetary Control," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(427), pages 1437-48, November.
  3. Giavazzi, Francesco & Pagano, Marco, 1986. "The Advantages of Tying One's Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility," CEPR Discussion Papers 135, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. McCallum, Bennett T., 1997. "Crucial issues concerning central bank independence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 99-112, June.
  5. Mourmouras, Iannis A., 1997. "On Wage Indexing, Policy Credibility and Inflation," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 19-30, January.
  6. Ben S. Bernanke & Frederic S. Mishkin, 1997. "Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?," NBER Working Papers 5893, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. King, Mervyn, 1997. "Changes in UK monetary policy: Rules and discretion in practice," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 81-97, June.
  8. Fratianni, Michele & von Hagen, Jurgen, 1993. "European monetary union and central bank independence," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 401-425, July.
  9. Alesina, Alberto & Gatti, Roberta, 1995. "Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 196-200, May.
  10. De Grauwe, Paul, 1996. "Inflation Targeting to Achieve Inflation Convergence in the Transition Towards EMU," CEPR Discussion Papers 1457, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May.
  12. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-86, March.
  13. John H. Green, 1996. "Inflation Targeting: Theory and Policy Implications," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 43(4), pages 779-795, December.
  14. Mourmouras, Iannis A., 1993. "Time consistency, indexation and the costs of inflation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 361-365.
  15. Michael Arghyrou, 2000. "EU participation and the external trade of Greece: an appraisal of the evidence," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(2), pages 151-159.
  16. Fischer, Stanley, 1995. "Central-Bank Independence Revisited," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 201-06, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Eleftheriou, Maria & Gerdesmeier, Dieter & Roffia, Barbara, 2006. "Monetary policy rules in the pre-EMU era: Is there a common rule?," Working Paper Series 0659, European Central Bank.

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