Unionisation Structures, Productivity, and Firm Performance
AbstractThis paper studies how different unionisation structures affect firm productivity, firm performance, and consumer welfare in a monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms and free entry. While centralised bargaining induces tougher selection among hetero- geneous producers and thus increases average productivity, firm-level bargaining allows less productive entrants to remain in the market. Centralised bargaining also results in higher average output and profit levels than either decentralised bargaining or a competitive labour market. From a welfare perspective, the choice between centralised and decentralised bar- gaining involves a potential trade-off between product variety and product prices. Extending the model to a two-country setup, I furthermore show that the positive effect of centralised bargaining on average productivity can be overturned when firms face international low-wage competition.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany in its series SFB 649 Discussion Papers with number SFB649DP2009-027.
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: May 2009
Date of revision:
Trade Unions; Productivity; Firm Performance; International Competition;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- F16 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Labor Market Interactions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-05-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2009-05-23 (Business Economics)
- NEP-EFF-2009-05-23 (Efficiency & Productivity)
- NEP-LAB-2009-05-23 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2009-05-23 (Microeconomics)
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