Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences
AbstractA game form constitutionally implements a social choice correspondence if it implements it in Nash equilibrium and, moreover, the associated effectivity functions coincide. This paper presents necessary and sufficient conditions for a unanimous social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable, and sufficient and almost necessary conditions for an arbitrary (but surjective) social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable. It is shown that the results apply to interesting classes of scoring and veto rules.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem in its series Discussion Paper Series with number dp323.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2003
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2005, vol. 33, pp. 381-396.
social choice correspondence; game form; effectivity function; constitutional implementation;
Other versions of this item:
- Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 2005. "Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 381-396, 09.
- Peleg,Bezalel & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 2003. "Constitutional Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences," Research Memoranda 025, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
- Peleg,Bezalel & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 2003. "Constitutional Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences," Research Memorandum 025, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- NEP-POL-2003-07-13 (Positive Political Economics)
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