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Subordinated debt, uninsured deposits, and market discipline: evidence from U.S. bank holding companies

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Author Info
Fatma Cebenoyan () (Hunter College)
A. Sinan Cebenoyan () (Hofstra University)

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Abstract

We investigate market discipline in banking through uninsured depositors and subordinated debt holders, using U.S. bank holding companies data from 1996 to 2005. We test to see both the monitoring and influencing aspects of market discipline. Although our results overall support the presence of monitoring through uninsured deposits, the evidence of influencing is mixed at best. We find some disciplining effect of changes in uninsured deposit levels and prices on bank fundamentals. We find no evidence of any disciplinary influences by subordinated debt holders. JEL Classification: G21, G28, G32 Key Words: Subordinated debt; Uninsured deposits; Market discipline; Banks.

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Paper provided by Hunter College: Department of Economics in its series Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers with number 421.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:htr:hcecon:421

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This page was last updated on 2008-10-10.

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