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Labor Contracts, Incentives, and Food Security in Rural Myanmar

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Author Info
Takashi Kurosaki
Abstract

This paper develops an agency model of contract choice in the hiring of labor and then uses the model to estimate the determinants of contract choice in rural Myanmar. As a salient feature relevant for the agricultural sector in a low income country such as Myanmar, the agency model incorporates considerations of food security and incentive effects. It is shown that when, possibly due to poverty, food considerations are important for employees, employers will prefer a labor contract with wages paid in kind (food) to one with wages paid in cash. At the same time, when output is responsive to workers' effort and labor monitoring is costly, employers will prefer a contract with piecerate wages to one with hourly wages. The case of sharecropping can be understood as a combination of the two: a labor contract with piecerate wages paid in kind. The predictions of the theoretical model are tested using a crosssection dataset collected in rural Myanmar through a sample household survey which was conducted in 2001 and covers diverse agroecological environments. The estimation results are consistent with the theoretical predictions: wages are more likely to be paid in kind when the share of staple food in workers' budget is higher and the farmland on which they produce food themselves is smaller; piecerate wages are more likely to be adopted when work effort is more difficult to monitor and the farming operation requires quick completion.

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Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series with number d05-134.

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Date of creation: Jan 2006
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Handle: RePEc:hst:hstdps:d05-134

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Related research
Keywords: contract; incentive; selection; food security; Myanmar;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Q12 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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  1. Chiappori, Pierre Andre & Salanie, Bernard, 2002. "Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Paarsch, Harry J & Shearer, Bruce, 2000. "Piece Rates, Fixed Wages, and Incentive Effects: Statistical Evidence from Payroll Records," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 59-92, February.
    Other versions:
  3. Agrawal, Pradeep, 1999. "Contractual structure in agriculture," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 293-325, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Marcel Fafchamps & Måns Söderbom, 2004. "Wages and Labor Management in African Manufacturing," Development and Comp Systems 0409043, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Eswaran, Mukesh & Kotwal, Ashok, 1985. "A Theory of Contractual Structure in Agriculture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 352-67, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Samar K. Datta & Jeffrey B. Nugent & Asher Tishler, 2004. "Contractual Mix Between Cash and Kind Wages of Casual Workers in an Agrarian Economy," Review of Development Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 8(4), pages 521-540, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Arimoto, Yutaka, 2005. "State-contingent rent reduction and tenancy contract choice," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 355-375, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kimball, Miles S, 1990. "Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(1), pages 53-73, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Fafchamps, Marcel, 1993. "Sequential Labor Decisions under Uncertainty: An Estimable Household Model of West-African Farmers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1173-97, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Daniel A. Ackerberg & Maristella Botticini, 2002. "Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 564-591, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Foster, Andrew D & Rosenzweig, Mark R, 1994. "A Test for Moral Hazard in the Labor Market: Contractual Arrangements, Effort, and Health," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 76(2), pages 213-27, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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