This paper analyzes the effects of pension benefits, family conditions, and personal characteristics of the elderly on their labor supply, wages, hours of work and job satisfaction in the framework of the Nash bargaining that an old worker and a firm bargain over employment conditions such as wages, hours of work and job investment. It will be stressed that as workers become aged, they come to put more priority on hours of work, work circumstances, the contents of a job rather than wages, and make them improved by job investment in the form of lower wages. This paper also shows empirically, controlling the income effect of pensions, that the effects of the reduction scheme of the Employees' Pension Plan on hours worked and labor participation of the elderly had disappeared by 2000.
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Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series with number
d04-40.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: J14 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped J26 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Retirement; Retirement Policies
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