Cross-Shareholdings, Outside Directors, and Managerial Turnover: The Case of Japan
AbstractWe have analyzed the monitoring role of outside directors in Japan. A detailed classification of each outside director into (1)former bankers; (2)former shareholders; (3)former cross-shareholders; and(4)pure outside directors reveals that only pure outside directors increase the turnover-performance sensitivity of inside directors. That is, we found that the background of each outside director is crucial for his or her role as a monitor.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series with number d04-38.
Date of creation: Aug 2004
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2004-08-31 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2004-08-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-SEA-2004-08-31 (South East Asia)
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