Deliberative and Non-Deliberative Negotiations
AbstractTheorists in all three major branches of deliberative theory have traditionally excluded from the concept of deliberation simple convergence to an outcome as well as any form of negotiation. In a major reformulation of the deliberative ideal, this paper argues that not only convergence but also incompletely theorized agreements, integrative negotiations, and fully cooperative distributive negotiations are valid forms of democratic deliberation. The analysis takes the absence of coercive power as the central feature of the â€œregulative idealâ€ of deliberation (a regulative ideal being a standard, admittedly impossible to achieve fully, toward which to strive). In their ideal forms, these four methods of achieving agreement do not involve coercive power. In the ideal, therefore, they are fully deliberative forms of negotiation. Democracies also need non-deliberative forms of negotiation and decision, which should be judged on other criteria, including the degree to which the parties involve exercise equal power.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Harvard Kennedy School of Government in its series Scholarly Articles with number 4415943.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series
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- Robert H. Frank & Thomas Gilovich & Dennis T. Regan, 1993. "Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 159-171, Spring.
- Mayntz, Renate, 1997. "Soziale Dynamik und politische Steuerung: Theoretische und methodologische Überlegungen," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 29, number 29.
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