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Collective Bargaining Laws, Threat Effects, and the Determination of Police Compensation

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  • Ichniowski, Casey
  • Freeman, Richard Barry
  • Lauer, Harrison

Abstract

This article demonstrates that state collective bargaining laws are important determinants of union and nonunion public employee compensation. State laws that provide stronger bargaining rights and ensure closure to the bargaining process increase the direct effect of police unions on compensation. Moreover, indirect threat effects on the pay of nonunion police also increase with stronger bargaining laws. In each law category investigated, nonunion police receive most of the compensation premium enjoyed by unionized police. Previous studies that have not adequately controlled for these effects of bargaining laws have therefore underestimated the full effect of public-sector unions on compensation.

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File URL: http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/4631949/Freeman_CollectiveBargaining.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Harvard University Department of Economics in its series Scholarly Articles with number 4631949.

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Date of creation: 1989
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Publication status: Published in Journal of Labor Economics
Handle: RePEc:hrv:faseco:4631949

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Cited by:
  1. Gregory, Robert G. & Borland, Jeff, 1999. "Recent developments in public sector labor markets," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 53, pages 3573-3630 Elsevier.
  2. Orley Ashenfelter & Dean Hyslop, 2001. "Measuring the effect of arbitration on wage levels: The case of police officers," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 54(2), pages 316-328, January.
  3. Anne Lauringson, 2010. "Measuring Union Bargaining Power In The Estonian Public Sector," University of Tartu - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration Working Paper Series 72, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, University of Tartu (Estonia).
  4. Stephen A. Woodbury & Daniel S. Hamermesh, . "Taxes, Fringe Benefits, and Faculty," Upjohn Working Papers and Journal Articles saw1992, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
  5. Juan Botero & Simeon Djankov & Rafael LaPorta & Florencio López-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, . "The Regulation of Labor," Working Paper 19483, Harvard University OpenScholar.
  6. Rebecca M. Blank, 1993. "Public Sector Growth and Labor Market Flexibility: The United States vs. The United Kingdom," NBER Working Papers 4339, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Ahn, Tom & Arcidiacono, Peter, 2004. "Paying to queue: a theory of locational differences in nonunion wages," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 565-579, May.

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