AbstractA mathematical characterization of self-enforcing bilateral contracts is given. Contracts where both parties exercise some control over the quantity traded can sometimes be superior to contracts that rest control entirely with one side. Some qualitative characteristics of these contracts are given.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Harvard University Department of Economics in its series Scholarly Articles with number 3204671.
Date of creation: 1983
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Publication status: Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics
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