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Bilateral Contracts

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  • Green, Jerry
  • Honkapohja, Seppo

Abstract

A mathematical characterization of self-enforcing bilateral contracts is given. Contracts where both parties exercise some control over the quantity traded can sometimes be superior to contracts that rest control entirely with one side. Some qualitative characteristics of these contracts are given.

Suggested Citation

  • Green, Jerry & Honkapohja, Seppo, 1983. "Bilateral Contracts," Scholarly Articles 3204671, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hrv:faseco:3204671
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Maskin, Eric, 1980. "A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(6), pages 1507-1520, September.
    2. Martin L. Weitzman, 1974. "Prices vs. Quantities," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(4), pages 477-491.
    3. Spence, Michael, 1977. "Nonlinear prices and welfare," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 1-18, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Russell Cooper, 1983. "Worker Asymmetric Information and Involuntary Unemployment," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 671R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 1984.
    2. Edward P. Lazear, 1982. "Severance Pay, Pensions, and Efficient Mobility," NBER Working Papers 0854, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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