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Sovereign Debt Booms in Monetary Unions

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  • Aguiar, Mark
  • Amador, Manuel
  • Farhi, Emmanuel
  • Gopinath, Gita

Abstract

We propose a continuous time model to investigate the impact of inflation credibility on sovereign debt dynamics. At every point in time, an impatient government decides fiscal surplus and inflation, without commitment. Inflation is costly, but reduces the real value of outstanding nominal debt. In equilibrium, debt dynamics is the result of two opposing forces: (i) impatience and (ii) the desire to conquer low inflation. A large increase in inflation credibility can trigger a process of debt accumulation. This rationalizes the sovereign debt booms that are often experienced by low inflation credibility countries upon joining a currency union.

Suggested Citation

  • Aguiar, Mark & Amador, Manuel & Farhi, Emmanuel & Gopinath, Gita, 2014. "Sovereign Debt Booms in Monetary Unions," Scholarly Articles 12559514, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hrv:faseco:12559514
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    1. repec:nbr:nberch:13317 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Wenxin Du & Jesse Schreger, 2013. "Local Currency Sovereign Risk," International Finance Discussion Papers 1094, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    3. Sergio Rebelo & Carlos A. Végh, 1995. "Real Effects of Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization: An Analysis of Competing Theories," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 125-188, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas & Thomas Philippon & Dimitri Vayanos, 2017. "The Analytics of the Greek Crisis," NBER Macroeconomics Annual, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 1-81.
    2. Aguiar, M. & Chatterjee, S. & Cole, H. & Stangebye, Z., 2016. "Quantitative Models of Sovereign Debt Crises," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1697-1755, Elsevier.
    3. Raveh, Ohad & Tsur, Yacov, 2020. "Reelection, growth and public debt," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    4. Michael U. Krause & Stéphane Moyen, 2016. "Public Debt and Changing Inflation Targets," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 142-176, October.
    5. Gente, Karine & León-Ledesma, Miguel A. & Nourry, Carine, 2015. "External constraints and endogenous growth: Why didn't some countries benefit from capital flows?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 223-249.
    6. Gilles Dufrénot & Anne-Charlotte Paret-Onorato, 2016. "Power-Law Distribution in the Debt-to-Fiscal Revenue Ratio: Empirical Evidence and a Theoretical Model," Working Papers halshs-01357797, HAL.
    7. Trebesch, Christoph & Zabel, Michael, 2017. "The output costs of hard and soft sovereign default," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 416-432.
    8. Engler, Philipp & Große Steffen, Christoph, 2016. "Sovereign risk, interbank freezes, and aggregate fluctuations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 34-61.
    9. Arce, Fernando, 2021. "Private Overborrowing under Sovereign Risk," MPRA Paper 113176, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Yasin Kursat Onder & Enes Sunel, 2021. "Inflation-default trade-off without a nominal anchor: The case of Greece," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 39, pages 55-78, January.
    11. Raveh, Ohad & Tsur, Yacov, 2020. "Resource windfalls and public debt: A political economy perspective," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    12. Arvind Krishnamurthy & Stefan Nagel & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, 2018. "ECB Policies Involving Government Bond Purchases: Impact and Channels [The “greatest” carry trade ever? Understanding eurozone bank risks]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 22(1), pages 1-44.
    13. Ohad Raveh & Yacov Tsur, 2018. "Resource Windfalls and Public Debt: The Role of Political Myopia," OxCarre Working Papers 205, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
    14. Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier & Philippon, Thomas & Vayanos, Dimitri, 2016. "The analytics of the Greek crisis: celebratory centenary issue," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67368, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    15. Hale, Galina B. & Jones, Peter C. & Spiegel, Mark M., 2020. "Home currency issuance in international bond markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    16. Stasavage, David, 2016. "What we can learn from the early history of sovereign debt," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 1-16.
    17. Ohad Raveh & Yacov Tsur, 2017. "Political Myopia, Public Debt," OxCarre Working Papers 200, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
    18. Foley-Fisher, Nathan & McLaughlin, Eoin, 2016. "Sovereign debt guarantees and default: Lessons from the UK and Ireland, 1920–1938," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 272-286.
    19. Oyarzo, Mauricio & Paredes, Dusan, 2023. "Shocks derived from mining windfalls and horizontal transfers: Exploring the permanent income hypothesis in Chilean municipalities from a spatial competition approach," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    20. Yasin Kürsat Önder & Enes Sunel, 2021. "Default of Depreciate," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 21/1023, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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