: Michele Boldrin (University of Minnesota, and CEPR) : Sergi Jiménez-Martín (Universidad Carlos III) : Franco Peracchi (Università di Roma Tor Vergata)
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. In this work we analyze the role of financial incentives to retire on the individual propensity to retire on a sample of Spanish Working histories from the Social Security administration. The results obtained are used to simulate the impact of various reform, including the 1997 Spanish reform on the average retirement age. Comparing the results of the reforms, only is partially effective that which suggest a delay of three years in the early and normal retirement ages. The results of the 1997 are negligible.
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Paper provided by Instituto de Estudios Fiscales in its series Working Papers with number
14-02 Classification-JEL : H55..
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