Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Civil Service Rules and Policy Choices: Evidence from US State Governments

Contents:

Author Info

  • Gergely Ujhelyi

    ()
    (University of Houston)

Abstract

This paper studies the policy impact of civil service regulations, exploiting reforms undertaken by US state governments throughout the 20th century. These reforms replaced political patronage with a civil service recruited based on merit and protected from politics. I find that state politicians respond to these changes by spending relatively less through the reformed state-level bureaucracies. Instead, they allocate more funds to lower level governments. The reallocation of expenditures leads to reduced long-term investment by state governments.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.uh.edu/econpapers/RePEc/hou/wpaper/201303249.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Houston in its series Working Papers with number 201303249.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 30 Jan 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hou:wpaper:201303249

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Houston TX 77023
Web page: http://www.uh.edu/class/economics/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: civil service rules; bureaucracy; intergovernmental transfers; patronage;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 2003. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 7-73, March.
  2. Oriana Bandiera & Andrea Prat & Tommaso Valletti, 2008. "Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment," CEIS Research Paper 115, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 14 Jul 2008.
  3. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2007. "Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part II: Multiple Policy Tasks," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000875, David K. Levine.
  4. Lakshmi Iyer & Anandi Mani, 2008. "Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India," Working Papers id:1781, eSocialSciences.
  5. Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, 1994. "The Federal Civil Service System and The Problem of Bureaucracy," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number john94-1.
  6. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2007. "Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 169-179, March.
  7. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1994. "Unnatural Experiments? Estimating the Incidence of Endogenous Policies," NBER Working Papers 4956, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Stephen Coate & Brian Knight, 2009. "Government Form and Public Spending: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Municipalities," NBER Working Papers 14857, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Rauch, James E & Evans, Peter B., 1999. "Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt0sb0w38d, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  10. Gergely Ujhelyi, 2012. "Civil Service Reform," Working Papers 201303216, Department of Economics, University of Houston.
  11. Johnson, Ronald N. & Libecap, Gary D., 1994. "The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226401713, August.
  12. Craig, Steven G & Inman, Robert P, 1982. "Federal Aid and Public Education: An Empirical Look at the New Fiscal Federalism," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 64(4), pages 541-52, November.
  13. Terry M. Moe, 2006. "Political Control and the Power of the Agent," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(1), pages 1-29, April.
  14. F. Andrew Hanssen, 2004. "Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 712-729, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Gergely Ujhelyi, 2012. "Civil Service Reform," Working Papers 201303216, Department of Economics, University of Houston.
  2. Sutirtha Bagchi, 2013. "The Effects of Political Competition on the Funding and Generosity of Public-Sector Pension Plans," 2013 Papers pba941, Job Market Papers.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hou:wpaper:201303249. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dietrich Vollrath).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.