Raising An Army: A Positive Theory Of Military Recruitment
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Hoover Institution, Stanford University in its series Working Papers with number e-88-46.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 1988
Date of revision:
military expenditures ; military service ; social choice;
Other versions of this item:
- Ross, Thomas W, 1994. "Raising an Army: A Positive Theory of Military Recruitment," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 109-31, April.
- Tom Ross, 1988. "Raising An Army: A Positive Theory Of Military Recruitment," Carleton Industrial Organization Research Unit (CIORU) 88-08, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
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- Mulligan, Casey B. & Shleifer, Andrei, 2004.
"Population and Regulation,"
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- John T. Warner & Beth J. Asch, 2001. "The Record and Prospects of the All-Volunteer Military in the United States," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 169-192, Spring.
- repec:ial:wpaper:5 is not listed on IDEAS
- Antonis Adam, 2012. "Military conscription as a means of stabilizing democratic regimes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 715-730, March.
- Timothy J. Perri, 2010. "The Draft and the Quality of Military Personnel," Working Papers 10-05, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
- Levy, Amnon, 2005. "Deterrence Capacity, Relative Performance, Adjustment Costs, Hazard, Killing Aversion and the Optimal Enlistment Age," Economics Working Papers wp05-01, School of Economics, University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia.
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