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Escalating games, Co-ordination and dominance Solvability

Author

Listed:
  • Marco Mariotti

    (School of Business and Economics, Queen Mary University of London)

Abstract

Inspired by the model of Kalai and Satterthwaite (1994), I define a class of abstract games which are proved to be dominance-solvable. I show moreover that, in the leading subclass of co-ordination games, they are solvable on the unique Pareto-dominant outcome.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Mariotti, 1998. "Escalating games, Co-ordination and dominance Solvability," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 98/12, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Feb 1998.
    • Handle: RePEc:hol:holodi:9812
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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