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Behaviour in a Two-Stage Public Goods Experiment

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Abstract

In a two-stage public goods experiment, we study the effect that subjects’ possibility of contributing to a public good in the first stage of the game has on the voluntary contributions to the second public good. Our results show that subjects do not follow either the Nash strategy or the Pareto efficient strategy and that they perceive the two public goods as substitutes.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London in its series Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics with number 05/05.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: May 2005
Date of revision: May 2005
Handle: RePEc:hol:holodi:0505

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Keywords: public goods; experiments; voluntary provision.;

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