A Game-Theoretical Approach to the Formation of Ethical Norms
AbstractThis essay showｓ the formation of the ethical-norms analytically by modeling them with a Bayesian game played by bounded-rational players. They are bounded-rational in the sense that they have limited memory. The players’ limited memory makes them forget other choices they had and think their relatively successful choice a convention. Deviation from it causes payoff decrease, thus, creates an incentive to penalize the deviator. Finally, reinforcement mechanism of repeating penalty makes the socially beneficial but personally costly convention an ethical norm.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University in its series Discussion paper series. A with number 157.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2005
Date of revision:
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