Is A Unified Macroeconomic Policy Necessarily Better for a Common Currency Area?
AbstractIt is widely assumed that a common currency makes it desirable to have also a common fiscal policy. However, if fiscal policy is a source of shocks, independent national fiscal policies are generally preferable because they allow risk diversification.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany in its series Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim with number 266/2005.
Date of creation: 2005
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Other versions of this item:
- Belke, Ansgar & Gros, Daniel, 2009. "Is a unified macroeconomic policy necessarily better for a common currency area?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 98-101, March.
- NEP-ALL-2005-10-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-MAC-2005-10-29 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2005-10-29 (Monetary Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Ansgar Belke & Friedrich Schneider, 2003.
"Privatization in Austria: Some Theoretical Reasons and First Results About the Privatization Proceeds,"
Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut fÃ¼r Volkswirtschaftslehre der UniversitÃ¤t Hohenheim
229/2003, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.
- Ansgar Belke & Friedrich Schneider, 2004. "Privatization in Austria: Some Theoretical Reasons and First Results About the Privatization Proceeds," CESifo Working Paper Series 1123, CESifo Group Munich.
- Ansgar Belke & Nilgün Terzibas, 2003. "Die Integrationsbemühungen der Türkei aus ökonomischer Sicht," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut fÃ¼r Volkswirtschaftslehre der UniversitÃ¤t Hohenheim 230/2003, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.
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"Financial Crisis, Global Liquidity and Monetary Exit Strategies,"
Ruhr Economic Papers
0183, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
- Ansgar Belke, 2010. "Financial Crisis, Global Liquidity and Monetary Exit Strategies," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 995, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Grüner, Hans Peter, 2010. "Why EMU is not a failure," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-11, March.
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