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Zur Politischen Rationalitaet der Finanzausgleichsreform in Deutschland

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany in its series Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim with number 239/2004.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:hoh:hohdip:239

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Keywords: Intergovernmental fiscal relations; Germany; overrepresentation; legislative bargaining;

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  1. Worthington, Andrew C & Dollery, Brian E, 1998. " The Political Determination of Intergovernmental Grants in Australia," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 299-315, March.
  2. Borck, Rainald & Owings, Stephanie, 2003. "The political economy of intergovernmental grants," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 139-156, March.
  3. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  4. McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.
  5. Homburg, Stefan, 1997. "Ursachen und Wirkungen eines zwischenstaatlichen Finanzausgleichs," EconStor Open Access Articles, ZBW - German National Library of Economics, pages 61-95.
  6. Alberto Porto & Pablo Sanguinetti, 2001. "Political Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants: Evidence From Argentina," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 237-256, November.
  7. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 1759, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Fehr, Hans, 2001. "Fiskalische und allokative Konsequenzen des neuen Länderfinanzausgleichs," Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik (1998 - 2007), ZBW – German National Library of Economics / Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 81(10), pages 573-579.
  9. Homburg, Stefan, 1994. "Anreizwirkungen des deutschen Finanzausgleichs," EconStor Open Access Articles, ZBW - German National Library of Economics, pages 312-330..
  10. Friedrich Schneider & Hans Pitlik & Harald Strotmann & G�nther Schmid, 2001. "On the politicization of intergovernmental fiscal relations in Germany after unification," Economics working papers 2001-05, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
  11. Grossman, Philip J, 1994. " A Political Theory of Intergovernmental Grants," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 78(3-4), pages 295-303, March.
  12. Atlas, Cary M, et al, 1995. "Slicing the Federal Government Net Spending Pie: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 624-29, June.
  13. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-38, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Hans Pitlik & Friedrich Schneider & Harald Strotmann, 2005. "Legislative Malapportionment and the Politicization of Germany's Intergovernmental Transfer System," IAW Discussion Papers 19, Institut für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (IAW).
  2. Hepp, Ralf & von Hagen, Jürgen, 2010. "Fiscal federalism in Germany: Stabilization and redistribution before and after unification," ZEI Working Papers B 02-2010, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn.

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