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The Global Crisis: Why Regulators Resist Reforms

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  • Leo F. Goodstadt

    (Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research, Trinity College, University of Dublin, The University of Hong Kong)

Abstract

An Anglo-American regulatory ¡¥culture¡¦ became associated with 30 years of worldwide economic reforms, global growth and monetary stability. American and British officials identified major sources of instability in their own financial markets before 2007 but remained non-interventionist, invoking the concepts of virtuous markets and moral hazard. They also ignored the policy defects revealed by past crises. Despite record banking losses and fiscal imbalances during the global crisis, their current resistance to regulatory reforms is supported by a powerful political and business consensus.

Suggested Citation

  • Leo F. Goodstadt, 2009. "The Global Crisis: Why Regulators Resist Reforms," Working Papers 322009, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:hkm:wpaper:322009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Damian Tobin, 2012. "The Anglo-Saxon paradox: corporate governance best-practices and the reform deficit in China's banking sector," Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(2), pages 147-168, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Non-Interventionism; Basel; Virtuous Markets; Moral Hazard; Regulatory Culture;
    All these keywords.

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