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The Global Crisis: Why Laisser-faire Hong Kong Prefers Regulation

Author

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  • Leo F. Goodstadt

    (Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research ,Trinity College, University of Dublin ,The University of Hong Kong)

Abstract

This paper explains why, despite the anti-Keynesian convictions of officials and academics, Hong Kong abandoned its initial commitment to the concepts of virtuous markets and moral hazard and resisted importing the prevailing Anglo-American regulatory ¡¥culture¡¦. It reviews foreign attacks on the government¡¦s intervention to protect financial markets during global crises and shows that these critics have misunderstood the limits of Hong Kong¡¦s attachment to laisser faire. The analysis traces the process by which increasingly strict regulation has been introduced without hindering the expansion of Hong Kong¡¦s role as a major international financial centre.

Suggested Citation

  • Leo F. Goodstadt, 2010. "The Global Crisis: Why Laisser-faire Hong Kong Prefers Regulation," Working Papers 012010, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:hkm:wpaper:012010
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    Cited by:

    1. Kapo Wong & Yuanzhi Zhang & Qiuming Cheng & Ming Chun Chao & Jin Yeu Tsou, 2022. "Comparison of Impervious Surface Dynamics through Vegetation/High-Albedo/Low-Albedo/Soil Model and Socio-Economic Factors," Land, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-20, March.
    2. Quah Chee-Heong, 2019. "China’s Dollar-linked Hong Kong during the Global Crisis," Apuntes del Cenes, Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia, vol. 38(67), pages 95-121, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Laisser Faire; Autonomy; Regulation; Competition; Moral Hazard; Virtuous Markets; United States; United Kingdom;
    All these keywords.

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