Gender Differences in Executive Compensation and Job Mobility
AbstractFewer women than men become executive managers. They earn less over their careers, hold more junior positions, and exit the occupation at a faster rate. We compiled a large panel data set on executives and formed a career hierarchy to analyze mobility and compensation rates. We find that, controlling for executive rank and background, women earn higher compensation than men, experience more income uncertainty, and are promoted more quickly. Amongst survivors, being female increases the chance of becoming CEO. Hence, the unconditional gender pay gap and job-rank differences are primarily attributable to female executives exiting at higher rates than men in an occupation where survival is rewarded with promotion and higher compensation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group in its series Working Papers with number 2011-013.
Date of creation: Mar 2011
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- George-Levi Gayle & Limor Golan & Robert A. Miller, 2012. "Gender Differences in Executive Compensation and Job Mobility," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(4), pages 829 - 872.
- NEP-ALL-2011-11-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2011-11-07 (Business Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2011-11-07 (Labour Economics)
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