Economics of Corporate Form: Why Do Russian Firms Prefer to Be Closed Companies?
AbstractIn Russia, an overwhelming number of joint-stock companies (JSCs) choose to become closed companies despite the fact that this corporate form strays far from the primary nature of stock companies. Using the results of a Japan-Russia joint enterprise survey conducted in 2005, we examine a variety of factors as to why Russian stock companies select to become closed companies. Our empirical results suggest the following four factors encouraging many of Russian firms to be closed JSCs: (a) a widespread insider-dominating corporate ownership structure emerging as a result of the mass-privatization policy; (b) a strong orientation among managers toward closed corporate organization due to the underdeveloped capital and managerial markets; (c) slumping needs for corporate finance; and (d) insufficient financial support from local financial institutions. The empirical relationship between corporate form and ownership structure exists, even if we assume the endogeneity of the two elements.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Russian Research Center, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series RRC Working Paper Series with number 3.
Length: 24 p.
Date of creation: May 2013
Date of revision:
Note: This paper was produced as a result of a Japan-Russia joint research project entitled “Corporate Governance and Integration Processes in the Russian Economy” launched by the Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University (Tokyo) and the Institute for Industrial and Market Studies, National Research University – Higher School of Economics (Moscow). The research was financially supported by the Japan Securities Scholarship Foundation (JSSF) and grants-in-aid for scientific research from the Ministry of Education and Science of Japan (Nos. 16530149; 17203019; 21402025; 23243032). I also thank Naohito Abe, Tatiana G. Dolgopyatova and Andrei Yakovlev for their valuable comments and Jim Treadway for his editorial assistance. Needless to say, all remaining errors are mine., Revised version; first published in December 2007
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Russia; corporate form; corporate governance; organizational choice;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- P31 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
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