Taxation and Public Goods Provision in China and Japan before 1850
AbstractWe develop a principal-agent model to study fiscal capacity in pre-modern China and Japan. Before 1850, both nations were ruled by stable dictators who relied on bureaucrats to govern their domains. We hypothesize that agency problems increase with the eographic size of a domain. In a large domain, the ruler's inability to closely monitor bureaucrats creates opportunities for the bureaucrats to exploit taxpayers. To prevent overexploitation, the ruler has to keep taxes low and government small. Our dynamic model shows that while economic expansion improves the ruler's finances in a small domain, it could lead to lower tax revenues in a large domain as it exacerbates bureaucratic expropriation. To test these implications, we assemble comparable quantitative data from primary and secondary sources. We find that the state taxed less and provided fewer local public goods per capita in China than in Japan. Furthermore, while the Tokugawa shogunate's tax revenue grew in tandem with demographic trends, Qing China underwent fiscal contraction after 1750 despite demographic expansion. We conjecture that a greater state capacity might have prepared Japan better for the arrival of the West after 1850.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series PRIMCED Discussion Paper Series with number 35.
Length: 41 p.
Date of creation: Feb 2013
Date of revision:
Comparative Institutional Analysis; Principal-Agent Problem; Dictatorships;
Other versions of this item:
- Tuan-Hwee Sng & Chiaki Moriguchi, 2013. "Taxation and Public Goods Provision in China and Japan before 1850," Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series gd12-284, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- N15 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Asia including Middle East
- N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
- O43 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
- P52 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Studies of Particular Economies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-HIS-2013-03-16 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-PUB-2013-03-16 (Public Finance)
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