Welfarist-Consequentialism, Similarity of Attitudes and Arrow's Gerneral Impossibility Theorem
AbstractTwo features of Arrow's social choice theory are critically scrutinized. The first feature is the welfarist-consequentialism, which not only bases social judgements about right or wrong actions on the assessment of their consequences, but also assesses consequences in terms of people's welfare and nothing else. The second feature is a similarity of people's attitudes towards social outcomes as a possible resolvent of the Arrow impossibility theorem. Two extended frameworks, one consequentialist and the other non-consequentialist, are developed. Both frameworks are shown to admit some interesting resolutions of Arrow's general impossibility theorem, which are rather sharply contrasting with Arrow's own perspective.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Paper with number 4.
Length: 23 p.
Date of creation: Dec 2000
Date of revision:
Note: This Version: July 17, 2000
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- Kotaro Suzumura & Yongsheng Xu, 2004. "Welfarist-consequentialism, similarity of attitudes, and Arrow’s general impossibility theorem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 237-251, 02.
- Kotaro Suzumura & Yongsheng Xu, 1999. "Welfarist-Consequentialism, Similarity of Attitudes and Arrow's Gerneral Impossibility Theorem," Discussion Paper Series a366, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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- Yukinori Iwata, 2009. "Consequences, opportunities, and Arrovian impossibility theorems with consequentialist domains," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 513-531, March.
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