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On Initial Conferment of Individual Rights

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Author Info
Kotaro Suzumura
Naoki Yoshihara
Abstract

An extended social choice framework is proposed for the analysis of initial conferment of individual rights. It captures the intuitive conception of decisionmaking procedure as a carrier of intrinsic value along with the instrumental usefulness thereof in realizing valuable culmination outcomes. Our model of social decision-making consists of two stages. In the first stage, the society decides on the game form rights-system to be promulgated. In the second stage, the promulgated game form rights-system, coupled with the revealed profile of individual preference orderings over the set of culmination outcomes, determines a fully-fledged game, the play of which determines a culmination outcome at the Nash equilibrium. A set of sufficient conditions for the existence of a democratic social choice procedure, which chooses a game form in the first stage that is not only liberal, efficient and Nash solvable, but also uniformly workable for every revealed profile of individual preference orderings over the set of culmination outcomes, is identified.

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Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number a502.

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Date of creation: May 2008
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Handle: RePEc:hit:hituec:a502

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Related research
Keywords: Extended alternative; Extended constitution function; Uniformly rational choice; Liberal game form; Non-consequentialist evaluation of rightssystem;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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  1. Gibbard, Allan, 1974. "A Pareto-consistent libertarian claim," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 388-410, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kotaro Suzumura, 1999. "Consequences, opportunities, and procedures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 17-40. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Deb, Rajat & Pattanaik, Prasanta K. & Razzolini, Laura, 1997. "Game Forms, Rights, and the Efficiency of Social Outcomes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 74-95, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Sen, Amartya, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(1), pages 152-57, Jan.-Feb.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Sen, Amartya K, 1976. "Liberty, Unanimity and Rights," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 43(171), pages 217-45, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Kotaro Suzumura, 1999. "Welfare Economics Beyond Welfarist-Consequentialism," Discussion Paper Series a382, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  7. Suzumura, Kotaro, 1978. "On the Consistency of Libertarian Claims," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(2), pages 329-42, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kotaro Suzumura & Yongsheng Xu, 1999. "Characterizations of Consenquentialism and Non-consequentialism," Discussion Paper Series a365, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    Other versions:
  9. Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Social choice," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 31, pages 1091-1125 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Kotaro Suzumura & Naoki Yoshihara, 2006. "On Initial Conferment of Individual Rights," Discussion Paper Series a478, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
  11. Bezalel Peleg, 1997. "Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 67-80. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2002. "Nash consistent representation of constitutions: a reaction to the Gibbard paradox," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 267-287, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Deb, Rajat, 1994. "Waiver, Effectivity and Rights as Game Forms," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 61(242), pages 167-78, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Gaertner, Wulf & Pattanaik, Prasanta K & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1992. "Individual Rights Revisited," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 59(234), pages 161-77, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Pattanaik, Prasanta K & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1994. "Rights, Welfarism, and Social Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 435-39, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Pattanaik, Prasanta K & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1996. "Individual Rights and Social Evaluation: A Conceptual Framework," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(2), pages 194-212, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Sen, Amartya, 1992. "Minimal Liberty," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 59(234), pages 139-59, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Hurwicz, Leonid & Schmeidler, David, 1978. "Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1447-74, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Kotaro Suzumura & Yongsheng Xu, 2004. "Welfarist-consequentialism, similarity of attitudes, and Arrow’s general impossibility theorem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 237-251, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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