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On Non-welfarist Social Ordering Functions

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Author Info
Naoki Yoshihara

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Abstract

In this paper, criticizing the welfaristfs framework in traditional welfare economics which provides a rather limited perspective for social evaluation, we propose a more comprehensive framework in which extended social ordering functions (ESOFs) are introduced. In this framework, not only welfaristic values, but also non-welfaristic values can be treated appropriately. Then, we examine the possibility of non-welfarist ESOFs which meet a value of Individual Autonomy, a criterion of non-welfairst distributive justice, and the welfarist Pareto principle. First, there is no first best ESOF in the sense that the above three axioms are satisfied simultaneously. Second, however, we can show the existence of some second best ESOFs, using a weaker lexicographic application method.

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Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number a497.

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Date of creation: Sep 2007
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Handle: RePEc:hit:hituec:a497

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Related research
Keywords: Extended alternative; Extended constitution function; Uniformly rational choice; Liberal game form; Non-consequentialist evaluation of rightssystem;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
I31 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - General Welfare
I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

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  1. Sen, Amartya K, 1977. "On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1539-72, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Charles Blackorby & Walter Bossert & David Donaldson, 2005. "Multi-profile welfarism: A generalization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 253-267, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Marc Fleurbaey & Alain Trannoy, 2003. "The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 243-263, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Sen, Amartya, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(1), pages 152-57, Jan.-Feb.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Marc Fleurbaey & Bertil Tungodden & Howard F. Chang, 2003. "Any Non-welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle: A Comment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(6), pages 1382-1386, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Naoki Yoshihara, 2000. "On Effcient and Procedurally-Fair Equilibrium Allocations in Sharing Games," Discussion Paper Series a397, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  7. Tadenuma, Koichi, 2002. "Efficiency First or Equity First? Two Principles and Rationality of Social Choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 462-472, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 2001. "Any Non-welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 281-286, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Kranich, Laurence, 1994. "Equal Division, Efficiency, and the Sovereign Supply of Labor," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 178-89, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Suzumura, Kataro, 1976. "Remarks on the Theory of Collective Choice," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 43(172), pages 381-90, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Pattanaik, Prasanta K & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1996. "Individual Rights and Social Evaluation: A Conceptual Framework," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(2), pages 194-212, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Roberts, Kevin W S, 1980. "Interpersonal Comparability and Social Choice Theory," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(2), pages 421-39, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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