This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Transforming Incentives: Analysis of Personnel and Employee Output Data in a Large J apanese Auto Sales Firm

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Tsuyoshi Tsuru
Abstract

This paper analyzes the economic consequences of performance-oriented human resource (HR) system reform at Auto Japan (pseudonym), one of the largest Japanese auto sales firms, using personnel and employee output data. The author overviews the three major components of the HR reform: base wages, performance-based pay, and performance rating systems. Then the author examines the productivity effect of the reform. The performance-based pay was changed from combining a base wage with a simple performance pay system to instead a scheme kinked around a draw line (representing aggregate base pay) to intensify incentives. The introduction of the draw formula performance-based pay system raised the productivity of the new car sales staff, but generally failed to raise the productivity of the used car sales staff. The evidence suggests that while Auto Japanfs performance-oriented HR system reform, which was typical of reforms instituted among major Japanese firms in the late 1990s, changed the wage structure and grading pattern of employees, it brought only slight improvement in individual productivity. Incentives have been the essence of economics and firm organization. Pay for performance has drawn great interest from both personnel economists and HR practitioners. Yet, it has been difficult to capture the relationship between pay and productivity in most industries and occupations. In path-breaking works, Lazear (2000) and Paarsh and Shearer (1999, 2000) show that the introduction of performance-based pay has the effect of stimulating employee effort. However, the jobs analyzed in those studies are too simple to hold much meaning for professional occupations. The purpose of this paper is to examine the economic consequences of performance-oriented human resource (HR) system reform at Auto Japan (pseudonym), one of the largest Japanese auto sales firms, using personnel and employee output data.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/Common/publication/DP/DP496.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number a496.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Aug 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hit:hituec:a496

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 2-1 Naka, Kunitachi City, Tokyo 186
Phone: +81-42-580-8327
Fax: +81-42-580-8333
Email:
Web page: http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Hiromichi Miyake).

Related research
Keywords:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Beth J. Asch, 1990. "Do incentives matter? The case of Navy recruiters," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 43(3), pages 89-106, February.
  2. Paarsch, Harry J & Shearer, Bruce, 2000. "Piece Rates, Fixed Wages, and Incentive Effects: Statistical Evidence from Payroll Records," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 59-92, February.
    Other versions:
  3. Edward P. Lazear, 2000. "Performance Pay and Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1346-1361, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Robert Gibbons, 1997. "Incentives and Careers in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 5705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Coughlan, Anne T & Narasimhan, Chakravarthi, 1992. "An Empirical Analysis of Sales-Force Compensation Plans," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(1), pages 93-121, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Paul Oyer, 1998. "Fiscal Year Ends And Nonlinear Incentive Contracts: The Effect On Business Seasonality," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(1), pages 149-185, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS indexes over 800000 items of research in Economics alone.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.