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Nonconvex Bargaining Problems

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Author Info
Yongsheng Xu
Naoki Yoshihara

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Abstract

This paper studies compact and comprehensive bargaining problems for n players and axiomatically characterize the extensions of the three classical bargaining solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: the Nash solution, the egalitarian solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Our characterizing axioms are various extensions of Nashfs original axioms.

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Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number a454.

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Date of creation: Jul 2004
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Handle: RePEc:hit:hituec:a454

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Mariotti, Marco, 1999. "Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(3), pages 733-41, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Conley, John P. & Wilkie, Simon, 1991. "The bargaining problem without convexity : Extending the egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 365-369, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Conley, John P. & Wilkie, Simon, 1996. "An Extension of the Nash Bargaining Solution to Nonconvex Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 26-38, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-18, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Herrero, Maria Jose, 1989. "The nash program: Non-convex bargaining problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 266-277, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Kalai, Ehud, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1623-30, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Feess Eberhard & Walzl Markus, 2006. "Why it Pays to Conceal - On the Optimal Timing of Acquiring Verifiable Information," Research Memoranda 020, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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