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Solidarity and Nash Bargaining Solution

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  • Naoki Yoshihara

Abstract

In this paper, we consider production economies with possibly unequal production skills and with possibility of technological innovations, in which resource allocations are determined via bargaining among individuals. We define the Nash bargaining solution as the (bargaining) allocation rule whose utility outcomes just result in the Nash bargaining outcomes. A new axion regarding compensation for low skill agents is introduced as a week version of solidarity condition w.r.t. change in production skills. Then, we show that the Nash bargaining solution is characterized as the unique efficient and symmetric bargaining allocation rule satisfying the responsibility and the compensation requirements, without the help of Nash IIA-flavor axiom.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number a409.

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Date of creation: Mar 2001
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Handle: RePEc:hit:hituec:a409

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Related research

Keywords: Nash bargaining solution; Axiomatic characterization; Responsibility and compensation; Solidarity w.r.t. change in production skill; Nash IIA.;

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