Solidarity and Nash Bargaining Solution
AbstractIn this paper, we consider production economies with possibly unequal production skills and with possibility of technological innovations, in which resource allocations are determined via bargaining among individuals. We define the Nash bargaining solution as the (bargaining) allocation rule whose utility outcomes just result in the Nash bargaining outcomes. A new axion regarding compensation for low skill agents is introduced as a week version of solidarity condition w.r.t. change in production skills. Then, we show that the Nash bargaining solution is characterized as the unique efficient and symmetric bargaining allocation rule satisfying the responsibility and the compensation requirements, without the help of Nash IIA-flavor axiom.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number a409.
Date of creation: Mar 2001
Date of revision:
Nash bargaining solution; Axiomatic characterization; Responsibility and compensation; Solidarity w.r.t. change in production skill; Nash IIA.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- I31 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General Welfare, Well-Being
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