Following the viewpoint of pure procedural justice, we analyze a social decision procedure for choosing fair allocation rules in production economics, which is formulated as an extended Arrovian constitution that aggregates each profile of individual social welfare functios into a social social welfare function. The identified allocation rule is characterized by three axioms with Rawlsian flavor. The difference principle is formulated, not in terms of the Rawlsian primary social goods, but in terms of the common capability in the Sen space of functionings. In this sense, our theory synthesizes the Rawlsian theory of justice as fairness and the Sen theory of capability. classification-jel: D63, D71, I31
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Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number
a379.