Welfarist-Consequentialism, Similarity of Attitudes and Arrow's Gerneral Impossibility Theorem
AbstractTwo features of Arrow's social choice theory are critically scrutinized. The first feature is the welfarist-consequentialism, which not only bases social judgements about right or wrong actions on the assessment of their consequences, but also assesses consequences in terms of people's welfare and nothing else. The second feature is a similarity of people's attitudes towards social outcomes as a possible resolvent of the Arrow impossibility theorem. Two extended frameworks, one consequentialist and the other non-consequentialist, are developed. Both frameworks are shown to admit some interesting resolutions of Arrow's general impossibility theorem, which are rather sharply contrasting with Arrow's own perspective.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number a366.
Date of creation: Mar 1999
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Kotaro Suzumura & Yongsheng Xu, 2004. "Welfarist-consequentialism, similarity of attitudes, and Arrow’s general impossibility theorem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 237-251, 02.
- Suzumura, Kotaro & Xu, Yongsheng, 2000. "Welfarist-Consequentialism, Similarity of Attitudes and Arrow's Gerneral Impossibility Theorem," Discussion Paper 4, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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- Yukinori Iwata, 2009. "Consequences, opportunities, and Arrovian impossibility theorems with consequentialist domains," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 513-531, March.
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