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Individual Rights and Social Evaluations: A Conceptual Framework

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  • Prasanta K. Pattanaik
  • Kotaro Suzumura

Abstract

The authors propose a framework for the analysis of social choice and welfare which uses the informational basis of individual preference orderings over the pairs of conventionally defined social alternatives and social decision-making mechanisms. In particular, they consider the case where the decision-making mechanism is a rights-structure modeled as game forms. The authors use this framework to clarify the role for individual preferences in conferring rights, in the realization of the conferred rights, and in describing the formal contents of rights. They also explore its implications for the controversial issue of the consistency of social choice and A. K. Sen's paradox of Paretian libertarianism. Copyright 1996 by Royal Economic Society.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number a250.

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Date of creation: Jan 1992
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Handle: RePEc:hit:hituec:a250

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Cited by:
  1. Bernard Steunenberg, 2001. "Enlargement and Institutional Reform in the European Union: Separate or Connected Issues?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 351-370, December.
  2. Polly Vizard, 2005. "The contributions of Professor Amartya Sen in the field of human rights," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 6273, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  3. Manimay Sengupta, 1996. "Informed Planner, Decentralized Decisions And Incentive Compatibility," Discussion Paper Series 12, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Oct 1996.
  4. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:30:y:2010:i:1:p:103-114 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Suzumura, Kotaro & Xu, Yongsheng, 2000. "Consequences, Opportunities, and Generalized Consequentialism and Non-consequentialism," Discussion Paper 5, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  6. Kotaro Suzumura & Yongsheng Xu, 1999. "Characterizations of Consenquentialism and Non-consequentialism," Discussion Paper Series a365, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  7. Sebastiano Bavetta & Marco Del Seta, 2001. "Constraints and the Measurement of Freedom of Choice," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 50(3), pages 213-238, May.
  8. Polly Vizard, 2005. "The Contributions of Professor Amartya Sen in the Field of Human Rights," CASE Papers 091, Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, LSE.
  9. Enrico Guzzini, 2010. "Efficient Nash equilibria, individual rights and Pareto principle: an impossibility result," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(1), pages 103-114.

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