Individual Rights and Social Evaluations: A Conceptual Framework
AbstractThe authors propose a framework for the analysis of social choice and welfare which uses the informational basis of individual preference orderings over the pairs of conventionally defined social alternatives and social decision-making mechanisms. In particular, they consider the case where the decision-making mechanism is a rights-structure modeled as game forms. The authors use this framework to clarify the role for individual preferences in conferring rights, in the realization of the conferred rights, and in describing the formal contents of rights. They also explore its implications for the controversial issue of the consistency of social choice and A. K. Sen's paradox of Paretian libertarianism. Copyright 1996 by Royal Economic Society.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number a250.
Date of creation: Jan 1992
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- Pattanaik, Prasanta K & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1996. "Individual Rights and Social Evaluation: A Conceptual Framework," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(2), pages 194-212, April.
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- Bernard Steunenberg, 2001. "Enlargement and Institutional Reform in the European Union: Separate or Connected Issues?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 351-370, December.
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