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The Interim Core of a Bayesian Pure Exchange Economy

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  • Ichiishi, Tatsuro
  • 市石, 達郎
  • Yamazaki, Akira
  • 山崎, 昭

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  • Ichiishi, Tatsuro & 市石, 達郎 & Yamazaki, Akira & 山崎, 昭, 2002. "The Interim Core of a Bayesian Pure Exchange Economy," Discussion Papers 2002-07, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    • Handle: RePEc:hit:econdp:2002-07
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    File URL: https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/17007/070econDP02-07.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 123-147, May.
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