This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The formality in property rights: determinant in the military strategy of armed actors

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Andrea P. Velásquez Guijo () (Universidad de los Andes)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The causes of internal conflicts are not easy to identify, and in order to understand its dynamics it is important to determine the factors that influence its persistence. The appropriation of economic resources has been identified as a cause of the conflict; however, asset appropriation may not be the main motivation for armed groups. On the contrary, it may be seen as a means of financing, which influences the conflict’s persistence. In Colombia, land appropriation has been a recurrent strategy for illegal armed groups in order to increase their territorial control and the institutional weakness when defining property rights may facilitate illegal appropriation of these assets. The hypothesis presented in this work is that the informality of property rights positively influences the armed groups’ decision of attacking and, therefore, influences the conflict’s intensity. In order to prove this hypothesis, an econometric model is proposed, which explains the conflict’s intensity through economic, social and institutional indicators at a municipal level. The results suggest that with a greater formality in property rights, the conflict’s intensity decreases.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.hicn.org/papers/wp39.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Households in Conflict Network in its series HiCN Working Papers with number 39.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 47 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hic:wpaper:39

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.hicn.org

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Theresa Jennings).

Related research
Keywords: Institutions; armed conflict; property rights; possession and use of land;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
P14 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Property Rights
P37 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Legal
Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Grossman, Herschel I, 1999. "Kleptocracy and Revolutions," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(2), pages 267-83, April.
  2. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Anderton, Charles H & Anderton, Roxane A & Carter, John R, 1999. "Economic Activity in the Shadow of Conflict," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 37(1), pages 166-79, January.
  4. Fabio Sánchez & María del Mar Palau, 2006. "Conflict, Decentralisation and Local Governance in Colombia, 1974-2004," HiCN Working Papers 14, Households in Conflict Network. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Deininger, Klaus & Ayalew, Daniel & Yamano, Takashi, 2006. "Legal knowledge and economic development : the case of land rights in Uganda," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3868, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James Robinson, 2004. "Institutions As The Fundamental Cause Of Long-Run Growth," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 002888, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1992. "Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 720-39, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Herschel I. Grossman, 2001. "The Creation of Effective Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 347-352, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Kirchhoff, Stefanie & Ibanez, Ana Maria, 2002. "Displacement Due To Violence In Colombia: Determinants And Consequences At The Household Level," Discussion Papers 18754, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF). [Downloadable!]
  10. Alston, Lee J. & Libecap, Gary D. & Mueller, Bernardo, 2000. "Land Reform Policies, the Sources of Violent Conflict, and Implications for Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 162-188, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke, 2000. "Greed and grievance in civil war," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2355, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Grossman, Herschel I, 1994. "Production, Appropriation, and Land Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 705-12, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Keefer, Philip & Knack, Stephen, 2002. " Polarization, Politics and Property Rights: Links between Inequality and Growth," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 111(1-2), pages 127-54, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Ana María Díaz & Fabio Sánchez, 2004. "Geografía De Los Cultivos Ilícitos Y Conflicto Armado En Colombia," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 002766, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Andre, Catherine & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 1998. "Land relations under unbearable stress: Rwanda caught in the Malthusian trap," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 1-47, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS indexes over 800000 items of research in Economics alone.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.