Discrimination: Believe it and You'll See It
AbstractThis paper presents a model where workers’beliefs and expectations about discrimination are significant. Identical firms announce vacancies and starting wages and workers apply to the firm. Workers are of two types, b and g, but identical in productivity. Firms do not prefer a particular type of worker over another. There is however a common belief among all workers that type b workers are discriminated against. This causes type b workers to avoid applying for jobs that offer wages perceived to be too high, since such workers believe that they don’t stand a chance against type g workers. In equilibrium some firms announce a job and high wages thereby attracting only type g workers, while others announce with low wages thereby attracting only type b workers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Labour Market Policy Research (CAFO), School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University in its series CAFO Working Papers with number 2006:10.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 25 Sep 2006
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Labour Market Policy Research (CAFO), School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University, SE 351 95 Växjö, Sweden
Phone: +46 470 70 87 64
Web page: http://lnu.se/research-groups/cafo?l=en
More information through EDIRC
Discrimination; Workers’ beliefs; Directed search;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J60 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - General
- J70 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - General
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