Do voters vote in line with their policy preferences? The role of information
AbstractThis paper investigates how information a ects voting behavior. Speci cally, I test (i) if more informed voters are better at voting for their most preferred politicians and (ii) if this translates into a bias on the aggregate level. To do so, I use a set of Swedish individual survey data on the preferences for public spending of both politicians and voters, which provides an opportunity to investigate how information affects voters' ability to match their preferences with those of the politicians. The results support both hypotheses: more informed voters are more likely to vote for their most preferred politicians, and on the aggregate level, I find that the left-wing parties would have received 1 to 3 percentage points fewer votes if all voters had been fully informed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Uppsala University, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series, Center for Fiscal Studies with number 2010:15.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 21 Dec 2010
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Phone: + 46 18 471 25 00
Fax: + 46 18 471 14 78
Web page: http://www.nek.uu.se/
More information through EDIRC
Voting behavior; Information; Vote aggregation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-01-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-01-03 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2011-01-03 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Per Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008. "Do Parties Matter for Economic Outcomes? A Regression-Discontinuity Approach," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 1037-1056, 09.
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