Gender Norms, Work Hours, and Corrective Taxation
AbstractThis paper deals with optimal income taxation based on a model with households where men and women allocate their time between market work and household production, and where households differ depending on which spouse has comparative advantage in market work. The purpose is to analyze the tax policy implications of gender norms represented by a market-work norm for men and household-work norm for women. We also distinguish between a welfarist government that respects all aspects of household preferences, and a paternalist government that disregards the disutility to households of deviating from the norms. The results show how the welfarist government may use tax policy to internalize the externalities caused by these norms, and how the paternalist government may use tax policy to make the households behave as if the norms were absent.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Umeå University, Department of Economics in its series Umeå Economic Studies with number 857.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 15 Apr 2013
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Umeå University, S-901 87 Umeå, Sweden
Phone: 090 - 786 61 42
Fax: 090 - 77 23 02
Web page: http://www.econ.umu.se/
More information through EDIRC
Social norms; household production; optimal taxation; paternalism;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics; Underlying Principles
- D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-04-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEM-2013-04-27 (Demographic Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2013-04-27 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2013-04-27 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2013-04-27 (Public Finance)
- NEP-SOC-2013-04-27 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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