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Optimal Income Taxation and Social Norms in the Labor Market

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Author Info
Aronsson, Thomas () (Department of Economics, Umeå University)
Sjögren, Tomas () (Department of Economics, Umeå University)
Abstract

This paper concerns optimal income taxation in a two-type model extended to allow for social interaction and social norms in the labor market. One type of norm relates to the hours of work among the employed, and we assume that there is a cost associated with deviating from 'normal behavior' (defined in terms of the average hours of work). Another type of norm refers to the pressure of earning one's living by working, where social interaction means that the perceived cost of being out of employment depends on the share of nonworkers in the population. The results show how, and why, the existence of social norms may modify results derived in earlier literature. Under reasonable assumptions, the norm referring to normal behavior in term of work hours provides an incentive for the government to increase the hours of work supplied by the high-ability type relative to the hours of work supplied by the low-ability type, whereas the norm of 'earning one's living by working' strengthens the employment-motive behind tax policy.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Umeå University, Department of Economics in its series Umeå Economic Studies with number 672.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 13 Mar 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:umnees:0672

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Postal: Department of Economics, Umeå University, S-901 87 Umeå, Sweden
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Fax: 090 - 77 23 02
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Related research
Keywords: Optimal Taxation; Social Interaction; Norms;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Lindbeck, Assar, 1995. " Welfare State Disincentives with Endogenous Habits and Norms," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 97(4), pages 477-94, December.
    Other versions:
  2. Woittiez, Isolde & Kapteyn, Arie, 1998. "Social interactions and habit formation in a model of female labour supply," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 185-205, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Aronsson, T. & Blomquist, N.S. & Sacklen, H., 1992. "How to Identify Interdependence Behavior in an Empirical Model of Labor Supply," Papers 1992-5, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
  4. Blomquist, N. Soren, 1993. "Interdependent behavior and the effect of taxes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 211-218, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Thomas Aronsson & Tomas Sjögren, 2004. "Is the Optimal Labor Income Tax Progressive in a Unionized Economy?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 106(4), pages 661-675, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Ronald Wendner, 2004. "Frames of reference, the environment, and efficient taxation," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 13-31, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Clemens Fuest & Bernd Huber, 1997. "Wage bargaining, labor-tax progression, and welfare," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 127-150, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jšrgen W. Weibull, 1999. "Social Norms And Economic Incentives In The Welfare State," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(1), pages 1-35, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Annegrete Bruvoll & Karine Nyborg, 2004. "The Cold Shiver of Not Giving Enough: On the Social Cost of Recycling Campaigns," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 80(4). [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Joerg Weibull, 2003. "Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Stern, Nicholas, 1982. "Optimum taxation with errors in administration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 181-211, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Jakee, Keith & Sun, Guang-Zhen, 2005. "External habit formation and dependency in the welfare state," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 83-98, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Luigi Bonatti, 2007. "Evolution of preferences and cross-country differences in time devoted to market work," Department of Economics Working Papers 0719, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia. [Downloadable!]
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