International Cooperation over Green Taxes: On the Impossibility of Achieving a Probability-One Gain
AbstractThis paper concerns international coordination of environmental taxation. The main purpose is to study the global welfare effects that will arise, if there is an agreement between countries to slightly increase their emission taxes. We show that even if each individual country has chosen its prereform emission tax to be 'too low' in comparison with the marginal cost of the environmental damage caused by that particular country's emissions, implementation of the agreement will not necessarily increase the welfare level.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Umeå University, Department of Economics in its series Umeå Economic Studies with number 522.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 11 Feb 2000
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Umeå University, S-901 87 Umeå, Sweden
Phone: 090 - 786 61 42
Fax: 090 - 77 23 02
Web page: http://www.econ.umu.se/
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Environmental taxation; global external effects;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- I31 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General Welfare, Well-Being
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2000-02-15 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2000-02-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2000-02-14 (Environmental Economics)
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- Aronsson, T. & Blomquist, S., 2000.
"Optimal Taxation, Global Externalities and Labor Mobility,"
2000:15, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
- Aronsson, Thomas & Blomquist, Soren, 2003. "Optimal taxation, global externalities and labor mobility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2749-2764, December.
- Aronsson, Thomas & Blomquist, Sören, 2000. "Optimal Taxation, Global Externalities and Labor Mobility," Working Paper Series 2000:15, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Aronsson, T. & Blomquist, S., 2000. "Optimal Taxation, Global Externalities and Labor Mobility," Papers 2000-15, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
- Thomas Aronsson & Sören Blomquist, 2001. "Optimal Taxation, Global Externalities and Labor Mobility," CESifo Working Paper Series 458, CESifo Group Munich.
- Aronsson, Thomas & Blomquist, Sören, 2000. "Optimal Taxation, Global Externalities and Labor Mobility," UmeÃ¥ Economic Studies 544, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
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