Auctioned and Re-auctioned Children in 19th Century Sweden
AbstractDuring the 19th century, poor and orphan Swedish children were boarded out. The foster-parents' compensation was determined in English auctions. Some children were re-auctioned. We use historical data from such auctions to study whether informational asymmetry and possibly adverse selection affected the outcome in the market for re-auctioned children. The empirical findings are consistent with adverse selection.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Umeå University, Department of Economics in its series Umeå Economic Studies with number 468.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 13 May 1998
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Umeå University, S-901 87 Umeå, Sweden
Phone: 090 - 786 61 42
Fax: 090 - 77 23 02
Web page: http://www.econ.umu.se/
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Adverse selection; asymmetric information; common value; English auction; private values;
Other versions of this item:
- Bergman, Mats A. & Lundberg, Sofia, 1998. "Auctioned and Re-Auctioned Children in 19th Century Sweden," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 273, Stockholm School of Economics.
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- N33 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - - - Europe: Pre-1913
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