Quantitative easing, global economic crisis and market response
AbstractWe develop a game theoretic model for the central banks profit and the markets profit dependent on quantitative easing (QE) or no quantitative easing (no QE), where the market responds by lowering interest rates, keeping interest rates unchanged, or raising interest rates. The model is compared with empirical data. We classify 69 QE events and 69 no QE counterfactuals for four central banks, i.e. 17 events for the Federal Reserve, 9 events for Bank of England, 32 events for Bank of Japan, and 11 events for the European Central Bank. The market response to the BoJ and ECB QE is almost exclusively to keep interest rates unchanged. Although this response is most common to the Federal Reserve QE (9 events), the market frequently responds as the Federal Reserve prefers, by lowering interest rates (7 events). For BoE the market response is evenly split across the three outcomes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Stavanger in its series UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance with number 2013/4.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 13 Jun 2013
Date of revision:
Central bank; quantitative easing; global economic crisis; market response;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
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NBER Working Papers
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