Social Screening and Cooperation Among Expert Chess Players
AbstractThis paper studies cooperation and social screening among expert chess players. It employs a large international panel dataset with controls for fixed effects, age, sex, nationality and playing strength where the latter accounts for productivity differences. With a female share below 15 percent both sexes screen women by cooperating more with men, especially professionals. With a female share above 15 percent, women cooperate more with women. Countrymen cooperate more than players of different nationalities, and language and geographic proximity also affect cooperation. The paper gives support to quota-based admission of women and minority groups in intellectually demanding professions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Swedish Institute for Social Research in its series Working Paper Series with number 4/2010.
Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 25 May 2010
Date of revision:
Gender; female share; costs; minority;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-06-04 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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