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On the Core of Games with Communication Structures

Author

Listed:
  • Albizuri, M. Josune

    (Faculty of Economics and Business Administration)

  • Sudhölter, Peter

    (Department of Business and Economics)

Abstract

It is well-known that the core on several domains of cooperative transferable utility (TU) and nontransferable utility (NTU) games is characterized by various combinations of axioms containing some versions of the reduced game property, of its converse, or of the reconfirmation property with respect to the Davis-Maschler reduced game. We show that these characterizations are still valid for games with communication structures a la Myerson when using the notion of the reduced communication structure that establishes a new link between two inside players if they can communicate via outside players. Thus, it is shown that, if communication structures are present, the core may still be characterized on balanced TU games, on totally balanced TU games, on NTU games with a nonempty core, on the domains of all TU or NTU games, and on several other interesting domains of TU and NTU games. As a byproduct we construct, for any NTU game with communication structure, a certain classical NTU game with the same core that may be regarded as its Myerson restricted NTU game.

Suggested Citation

  • Albizuri, M. Josune & Sudhölter, Peter, 2014. "On the Core of Games with Communication Structures," Discussion Papers on Economics 6/2014, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2014_006
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Herings, P.J.J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A.J.J. & Yang, Z., 2010. "The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 626-633, March.
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    3. Predtetchinski, Arkadi & Jean-Jacques Herings, P., 2004. "A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 84-92, May.
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    5. Peter Sudhölter & Yan-An Hwang, 2001. "Axiomatizations of the core on the universal domain and other natural domains," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(4), pages 597-623.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    TU and NTU game; Solution; Communication structure; Core;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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